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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to analyze the relation of education on the juvenile crime committed by
14-year-olds. We use a change in compulsory schooling law passed in Brazil in 2006 that
anticipated the entry of youths in the first grade of elementary school. According to the law,
new students must be enrolled in this grade at the age of six instead of seven. We argue
that a change in the curriculum rather than an extra year of schooling may correlate with
crimes. We analyze whether municipalities with a higher proportion of 14-year-olds in this
new system reveal changes in criminal outcomes. Although previous literature suggest that
this policy has a positive effect on students’ academic performance due to improvements
in Mathematics and Portuguese scores, which may discourage delinquent behavior, our
results indicate a positive correlation between the policy and crime. Estimates show a
positive relation between auto thefts committed by 14-year-olds and policy expansion. The
results by gender also point to an increase in this crime for both, with greater magnitude
for males. Furthermore, our findings evidence that delinquent behavior persists among
youths aged 15-17, especially drug dealing. Despite our robustness tests provide additional
evidence of the positive relation between crime and the policy expansion, our estimates
are still a first investigation that indicates only a correlation between the new policy and
criminal outcomes.
Key-words: Education. Compulsory schooling law. Juvenile crime.
RESUMO
Este artigo visa analisar a relação da educação sobre a criminalidade juvenil cometida por
jovens de 14 anos de idade. É usada uma mudança na lei de escolaridade compulsória
aprovada no Brasil em 2006 que antecipou a entrada de jovens na primeira série do ensino
fundamental, com isso a duração do ensino fundamental passou de oito para nove anos.
De acordo com a lei, novos alunos devem ser matriculados nesta série aos seis anos de
idade ao invés de sete. É argumentado que uma mudança no currículo em vez de um ano
extra de escolaridade pode estar correlacionada com os resultados criminais. É analisado
se os municípios com maior proporção de jovens de 14 anos neste novo sistema evidenciam
variações sobre resultados criminais. Embora resultados anteriores da literatura mostrem
que esta política tem um efeito positivo nos resultados acadêmicos dos alunos devido a
melhorias nas notas de matemática e português, o que pode desencorajar o comportamento
delinquente, os resultados indicam uma correlação positiva entre a política e o crime. As
estimativas mostram uma relação positiva entre furtos de carros cometidos por jovens de
14 anos e a expansão da política. Os resultados por gênero também apontam para um
aumento deste crime para ambos, com maior magnitude para os homens. Os resultados
também evidenciam que o comportamento delinquente persiste entre jovens de 15-17 anos,
especialmente no tráfico de drogas. Apesar de os testes de robustez fornecerem evidências
adicionais da relação positiva entre o crime e a expansão da política, as estimativas ainda
são uma primeira investigação que indicam apenas uma correlação entre a nova política e
os resultados criminais.
Palavras-chave: Educação. Lei de escolaridade compulsória. Crime juvenil.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Crime is a problem that affects all countries. Public policies that aim to mitigate the
negative consequences of this have a direct impact on reducing homicide rates, incarceration
rates and improving the population perception of security.
Other policies may also indirectly affect crime. The literature points to a strong
correlation between education and criminal outcomes. Insertion into delinquent behavior
depends on the opportunity costs that education provides by increasing individual skills.
If the returns of schooling are greater than the returns of crime, the opportunity costs of
committing delinquent activity are greater, which discourages individuals from engaging in
illicit activity (Lochner, 2007). These costs involve loss of earnings and loss of opportunities
in the labor market. On the other hand, if education does not provide higher returns
than crime, individuals may be encouraged to commit it because they realize that the
opportunity costs of crime may be lower. Education may also influence criminal acts that
require more schooling, such as white-collar crime. Therefore, the effects of education
on crime can be positive or negative. It depends on the incentives that education may
provide.
The returns of education have the greatest impact on the younger population.
Criminal behavior in adolescence can generate negative outcomes in adulthood related to
declines in earnings, unemployment and the possibility of imprisonment. Young people
who commit crime in adolescence may show low academic performance, besides that, they
have greater chances of failing or dropping out of school. For this reason, policies aimed at
school attendance, educational attainment or keeping them away from crime-stimulating
environments play an important role in reducing criminal activities. Youths penalized by
justice may again commit crimes due to difficulties of reintegration, social stigma or social
exclusion (Hannon, 2003). Beyond the impacts on their own lives, other people are also
affected through victimization costs, security expenditures, costs to repair damages, and
also from criminal justice system spending (McCollister et al., 2010). Therefore, juvenile
crime generates individual and public losses.
Given the importance of education on crime, this thesis examines the relation
between juvenile crimes and an educational reform passed in Brazil in 2006. The reform
aimed to increase the schooling of basic education students in both public and private
schools. In this policy, elementary school years increased from eight to nine years. Prior
to the enactment of this law, children were enrolled in the first grade of elementary school
at age seven. After that, the mandatory age decreased to six years old. Although this
policy has affected all Brazilian states, we only focus on the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
The choice of this region was based on the fact that it has fewer restrictions on the crime
base and program coverage than other available states.
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We explore the difference in treatment intensity across the municipalities of Rio
Grande do Sul to find evidence that early entrance reform is related to criminal activities
committed by 14 year-olds. We argue that the effect of the reform results from a change
in curriculum and not from an additional year of schooling. Individuals exposed to this
reform have more time to learn literacy and numeracy, which can help them to understand
easier the content taught. These learning gains are reflected throughout basic education,
reducing the chances of failing or dropping out of school. This may reflect on better labor
market prospects than crime, which may discourage delinquent behavior. Our estimates
do not show causality between education and crime due the weakness of our identification
assumption. It is only an investigation of the correlation between the new policy and
criminal outcomes.
This thesis contributes to the literature that analyzes the effects of education on
juvenile crime. Because of its nature, juvenile crime differs from the nature of crimes
committed by adults, the effect of education on crime may differ among them. While
criminal activities among youths increase during the weekdays and school hours (Taylor-
Butts, 2010; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003), crimes committed by adults tend to increase over
the weekend. Studies show that adults are prone to commit criminal activities motivated
by economic interests and with greater intensity at night. In contrast, financial benefits
are not the only factor that determines delinquent behavior among youths. They are
also motivated by entertainment, lack of activities in spare time or social status (Goldson
and Muncie, 2015; Luallen, 2006). Since educational policies have a larger impact on the
younger population, measuring the impact of policy change on this age group captures
the effects of the policy more concisely. These effects contribute to keeping youth in
school and out of crime-prone environments. Through this, the negative impacts of crime
are mitigated, such as youth unemployment, higher crime rates, lower economic growth,
and decreases in gross income (Detotto and Otranto, 2010). We also contribute with
a new perspective of this policy. Rosa et al. (2019) evaluate the impact of this reform
on students’ school performance. The results showed that students exposed to the new
academic curriculum improved their Mathematics and Portuguese scores. We evaluate the
relation between the policy and other social outcomes, that is, juvenile crime.
This thesis is divided as follows. Section 2 focuses on the literature review. Section
3 reviews the institutional background. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. The
main results are in section 5. Finally, section 6 brings a brief conclusion.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Education provides a wide range of benefits that extend beyond increases in labor
market productivity (Becker and Mulligan, 1997). The effects include health (Lleras-
Muney, 2005; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006), citizenship (Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011) and crime. They are known as non-production benefits of education (Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2000; Lochner, 2011). In the case of crime, education would discourage insertion
in criminal activities, which would have short- and long-term effects on crime (Hjalmarsson
and Lindquist, 2018). In addition, education produces positive externalities as decreasing
incarceration-related expenditures, and tends to contribute to the reduction of deaths (see
McCollister et al. (2010) for a crime-costing literature).
Educational attainment may provide long-term effects on criminal activity related
to the increase in individual levels of human capital and labor market skills. Higher levels
of qualification impact on lower probabilities of unemployment and may increase wage
earnings. These factors increase the opportunity costs of crime related to planning and
participating in criminal activity (Gould et al., 2002; Machin and Meghir, 2004). Wage
changes may have a greater effect on violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) crime
than on property (burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson) crime. Although violent crime
require less time for planning and execution than property crime, they are associated with
higher expected probabilities of arrest, conviction and incarceration (Lochner, 2007).
There are two channels through which education impacts the choice between
legitimate work and crime. If marginal returns from investments in education exceed those
from crime, then schooling has the power to reduce crime, especially the street one. On
the other hand, educational investments can have a positive impact on crime due to the
development of criminal skills (Lochner, 2004). For example, white-collar crime (such as
forgery, fraud, and embezzlement) can increase with education if they sufficiently reward
skills learned in school.
A number of recent studies have empirically estimated a significant negative corre-
lation between educational attainment and crime. In order to allow a causal interpretation,
the papers generally use exogenous changes in compulsory schooling laws over time as an
instrument for education. In the United States, Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate the
effect of education on participation in criminal activity using changes in state compulsory
schooling laws over time. The results showed that an additional year of schooling reduces
the probability of incarceration for males and decreases violent and property crimes. In a
related work, Bell et al. (2016) analyze the results found in Lochner and Moretti (2004)
using the latest database. Estimates showed a negative effect on crime from stricter
compulsory schooling laws, but also there is a weaker and sometimes non-existent link
between such laws and educational attainment. Using that same exogenous change, similar
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results are also found in England and Wales (Machin et al., 2011), Italy (Buonanno and
Leonida, 2006), Sweden (Hjalmarsson et al., 2015), and in South Africa (Jonck et al.,
2015). Cano-Urbina and Lochner (2017) showed for both violent and property crimes a
decrease in female arrest rates, whereas there is little impact on white collar crime. In the
case of Italian-American mafia, Campaniello et al. (2016) found that white collar crimes
increase with education, especially embezzlement and bookmaking.
Other exogenous sources of variation are explored to find a causal effect of edu-
cational attainment on crime. Amin et al. (2016) use job training for young adults in
United States (e.g., Job Corps) as an instrumental variable for degree attainment. The
estimates showed that attainment of a degree also reduces arrest rates. Other studies
explore common characteristics of twins to control for unobserved characteristics affecting
both criminal behavior and the schooling decisions. Using a sample of Australian twins,
Webbink et al. (2012) find that early arrests reduce educational attainment and lower
the probability of completing senior high school. In the case of Danish twins, Bennett
(2018) estimate that the completion of upper secondary education reduces both violent
crime and property crime for males. Despite the use of an alternative exogenous source,
these estimates are very close to those found using changes in compulsory schooling laws,
reiterating a causal effect of education on crime.
School attendance plays an important role in reducing contemporaneous criminal
activities. Firstly, school may have an incapacitating effect (as pointed out by Aizer
(2004); Anderson (2014); Fallesen et al. (2018)). Due to the extended school days, the
opportunities to commit delinquent behavior are more limited. Students are also less
likely to be victims within the school than if they were on the street. However, this
effect depends on the ease with which students can engage in crime during the time they
are out of school. Extending school days may also provide increases in human capital
levels and improve future employment prospects. This raises the imprisonment costs, and
discourages engagement in crime while they are enrolled in school. However, it is possible
that longer school days may have a positive effect on crime due to the peer effects of crime
(see Bayer et al. (2009); Damm and Dustmann (2014); Corno (2017)). Students who are
more crime-prone may engage in criminal activities during school as well as encourage
other students. Billings and Billings and Phillips (2017) showed that schools with many
high risk students may have more negative social interactions, making the school a place
that intensifies criminal outcomes.
Empirically, there is a negative correlation between school attendance and crime.
The recent studies shed light on the effects by estimating the impacts of different mecha-
nisms that directly affect youth schooling attendance. Beatton et al. (2018) analyse the
introduction of an Earning or Learning reform on youth crime in Queensland, Australia.
Estimates showed a decrease in property crime as well as impacts on drug crime. In
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Sweden, the reform of vocational upper secondary education impacted on decrease in
property crimes, although it had no effect on violent crimes, as pointed out by Åslund
et al. (2018). Berthelon and Kruger (2011) also found out a decrease in crime rate due to
implementation of integral education in Chile.
Other researches, such as Jacob and Lefgren (2003), and Luallen (2006), explore
variation in teacher in-service days and teacher strike days, respectively. Both studies find
a negative effect on property crimes, but the effect is positive for violent crimes when
the school term was interrupted. Fischer and Argyle (2018) explore the adoption of the
four-day school week policy across schools in Colorado, in the USA. Their results showed
that on average crimes increase as a result of the policy, mainly property crimes. Steinberg
et al. (2019) suggest that closing schools characterized by low educational performance
may also reduce crime in Philadelphia, mainly violent crime.
School starting age is also explored by literature in order to verify its effects on
crime. Children who enter school later tend to be more mature, cognitively developed and
engaged in class (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Datar, 2006). This positively interferes with
learning gains and makes them less likely to fail or drop out of school. As the latter are
related to the increase in crime, this policy would contribute to the reduction of youth
crime. This policy also affects younger children who interact with older children, and
may alter their social interactions or make learning gains through peer interactions within
the classroom. Depew and Eren (2016)’s findings suggest that late school entry by one
year decreases the incidence of juvenile crime for young black females, particularly in
high crime areas. Landersø et al. (2016) and McAdams (2016) also find similar results,
with lower propensity to commit crime at younger ages and decreasing incarceration rates,
respectively. However, Cook and Kang (2016) pointed out that these individuals are more
likely to drop out of high school before graduation and to commit felony offense. This is
because some of them reached the minimum age for dropping out of school and did not
have sufficient incentives to continue studying. Anderson (2014) showed that increasing
the minimum age for dropping out of school impacts on juvenile crime, with positive
effects on property crime and arrest rates. However, Anderson et al. (2013)’s findings
suggest that it may increase the student victimization due the displacement of crime from
the streets to schools.
Despite those previous evidences that support the benefits of delaying school entry,
there is still some controversy about this. Elder and Lubotsky (2009) argue that delaying
school entry by one year negatively affects children’s academic results because they do not
accumulate skills earlier, which can generate smaller learning gains. This result is highest
among those groups with low educational opportunities. The authors also show that the
effect of studying with older colleagues would not generate significant learning gains for
younger students. Fuller et al. (2017) support the previous results, showing that children
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with higher emphasis on academic skills produce better test scores than children with
higher emphasis on social skills. Therefore, the interaction among students of different
ages is not pointed out as determinant either.
There are important policy lessons regarding education and crime. Interventions
focusing on school attendance, educational attainment or keeping youths away from crime-
stimulating environments play an important role in reducing delinquent behavior. These
policies generate benefits both for them and for society as a whole.
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3 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The process of the Brazilian basic education reformulation has already been debated
in the 1990s. The first regulation was through the Law 9.394 of 1996 that began to allow
the enrollment of six-year-old students in a nine-year elementary school system. Through
the approval of the National Plan of Education (PNE) in 20011 nine-year elementary
school became a goal to be achieved for the national education. As of 2006, after the
enactment of government Law 11.274 of 2006, the implementation of nine-year elementary
school became mandatory. Municipalities should adopt the policy by 2010 in both public
schools (municipal, state and federal) and private schools.
Basic education in Brazil is divided into three stages: Preschool, Elementary School,
and High School. These stages did not change after the enactment of the law, but there was
a change in the time spent in both preschool and elementary school. Figure 1 shows the
new organization of Brazilian elementary school before and after the reform. Elementary
school increased from eight to nine years and preschool decreased from three to two years.
The policy did not affect high school. The main change caused by this law was that
instead of students spending three years in preschool (from four years to six years of age),
they now remain only two years (until five years old), with the final year of preschool
being reversed as the first year of elementary school. As result, students enter elementary
school at six years old instead of seven years old. Since preschool was not compulsory2,
the reform can be seen as an increase in one year of schooling for those individuals who
probably would not be in school at six years old. According to Ministério da Educação
(2009) data, approximately 90% of Brazilian children aged six were already attending
school before the policy. Therefore, the effect of one year more of schooling affected only a
small percentage of children.
Due to this reform, the total years of basic education are divided as follows. During
preschool, students attend two years of school. They are enrolled at four years old and
they remain until five years old. Elementary school lasts nine years, with students entering
at six years old and finishing at fourteen years old. Finally, after three more years in high
school, students complete basic education at seventeen years old3.
The process to implement the policy was the responsibility of the municipalities.
They sent a document to their respective Educational Council (State or Municipal)
1 Law 10.172 of 2001.
2 Since the Law 12.796 of 2013, the enrolment of four-year-olds in basic education has been
mandatory. Before that, only elementary school was.
3 For those individuals who do not complete basic education at the stipulated age, the Brazilian
educational system offers another option through the Educação para Jovens e Adultos program
(EJA). The minimum age to enter this system is eighteen years old in high school and fifteen
years old in elementary school. Students attend regular classes and, at the end of the course,
take a test that certifies the completion of schooling.
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ensuring that their schools were prepared to implement the reform. This included sufficient
enrollment for the new students, adequate physical structure and qualified teachers for
the new grade.
Figure 1 – New organization of Brazilian elementary school before and after the early entrance
reform.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Another important aspect was the reformulation of the political pedagogical project
of schools (PPP). They introduced new contents for first graders and these were different
from those taught in the third grade of preschool as well as in the first grade before the
reform. Ministério da Educação (2009) argues that the reform cannot be seen merely as
an adaptation of school grades, but as an improvement in the quality of education that
prioritizes the interests and needs of students. Early entry into elementary school allows
students to be literate earlier and to be exposed to content more focused on developing
academic skills, unlike in the third grade of preschool, where the focus was on socialization
and playing. As a result of that, the new students have more time to learn literacy and
numeracy content, which would impact on improving their school performance.
This reformulation of Brazilian basic education only affected new students. If the
students were already enrolled in school before the school adopted the policy, they do not
suffer from change in the curriculum. They remain in the grade that they were enrolled.
In the case where the school adopted the policy before the students were enrolled, they are
allocated according to the new system. If the individual is five years old, enrollment must
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be made in preschool. If the individual completes six years of age the enrollment is made
in the first grade of elementary school. Nevertheless, the Brazilian educational system
allows schools to accept new student enrollments until a cut-off date. In most Brazilian
municipalities, it is until March 31st. In the case of preschool, children can be enrolled if
they turn four years old by that date. If the date of birth is after that (e.g. on April 1st),
they must expect until the next school year to be enrolled4. The same applies for students
entering elementary school. If they turn six years old after March 31st, they must remain
in preschool until the next school year. Therefore, the cut-off date allows students under
the age of six to be in the first grade of elementary school.
As stated, the federal government stipulated that by 2010 all municipalities should
adopt the policy. For this reason, it was possible that there would be variations at the
time of adoption across regions. This can be explained by the fact that Brazilian education
is the responsibility of local governments (states or municipalities) that determine school
policies in the region. Depending on their interest, municipalities adopted the reform at
different times.
Figure 2 – Early entrance program expansion in Brazil.
Note: This figure shows the proportion of public schools (municipal and state) that
adopted the early entrance program by municipality.
Source: School Census, (INEP, 2019). Elaborated by the authors.
In this respect, the state of Rio Grande do Sul presents one of the most gradual
coverage of the policy. In some states almost all municipalities had already adopted
the reform before the law was enacted. In 2005, the percentage was above 80% of the
municipalities in the state of Minas Gerais and 100% in Rio de Janeiro. On the other
hand, this percentage in Rio Grande do Sul was only 10.69%. Considering the country,
4 Normally, the school year starts in February.
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27.8% of Brazilian municipalities have adopted the policy in that year. When the law was
enacted, both Brazil and Rio Grande do Sul had similar coverage, around 50%. In 2009,
coverage reached 99% of municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul and 92% in Brazil.
Schools may also have adopted the regime at different times. Figure 2 shows
the proportion of public schools covered by the reform across municipalities and within
municipalities. In 2004, the municipalities that are part of the states of Minas Gerais
and Rio de Janeiro already had a large proportion of public schools covered by the
policy, representing 86.9% and 99.85%, respectively. In the case of Rio Grande do Sul,
approximately 5% of public schools implemented the policy in 2004. When the law was
enacted, the proportion in the state was close to that of Brazil, with 30.2% and 34.49%,
respectively. One year later, the state achieved about 70% coverage while the country was
just over 50%.
Therefore, the policy expansion was different among the Brazilian regions. Some
of them had already adopted the policy before the enactment of the law and reached the
coverage of a large number of municipalities and schools. In the state of Rio Grande do





We analyze the correlation of the new policy on juvenile crime using an annual
panel data from 2004 to 2017. We collect educational information and the number of
reported crimes committed by 14 years old youths for each municipality in the state of
Rio Grande do Sul.
Although this policy has affected all Brazilian states, we only focus on the state of
Rio Grande do Sul. The first reason for choosing this region is the availability of data.
We consulted several Departments of Public Security in the Brazilian states and only that
of Rio Grande do Sul contained the data we needed. Since we are working with data on
offenders, the limitation for obtaining it is even greater, because most official Brazilian
data refer to victims. Another limitation was finding data disaggregated by age that had a
low number of incomplete information. The data provided by Rio Grande do Sul contain
less than 1%. As a comparison, the data provided by the state of São Paulo contain more
than 80% of the information without age. The second reason was the coverage of the
policy. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the crime base had a low proportion of
incomplete data, but its municipalities already represented a large proportion of coverage
even before the law was enacted. On the other hand, the municipalities of Rio Grande
do Sul began to implement the policy on a large scale only after the reform. Given these
limitations, the choice of this state for the evaluation of this reform is the most appropriate.
Our criminal database contains criminal reports with the address and municipality
of occurrence, the type of crime and the date of the fact. The age, date of birth and
ethnicity of the offender are also available. Although the address of the crime is available,
a small number of this information is complete, not making it feasible to use it in a less
aggregate manner than at the municipality level. The names of municipalities are complete
in all reported crime information.
We cannot compare municipalities that adopted the reform versus those that did
not, because the schools offered the new grade at different times. This could lead to
treated and untreated schools being within the same municipality. Given these limitations,
we choose to estimate using a treatment intensity variable, which measures the proportion
of students covered by the policy in each municipality.
4.1.1 Educational database
We created our educational database using the data available in the School Census.
It is an annual survey of statistical data on Brazilian public and private schools. We
excluded from the sample private schools, schools located in hamlets, prisons or indigenous
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areas. Despite the restrictions, our sample corresponds to 80% of the original database.
We calculate our treatment intensity variable using the proportion of students
aged 14 years covered by the policy in each municipality. It was created by dividing the
total number of 14 year old students enrolled in the new system by the total enrollment
of students of this same age. Equation 1 shows how the variable was created for the
municipality m in period t. This variable represents the proportion of students covered by
the reform.
Equation (1):
Prop = Number of 14-year-olds enrolled in the new systemSum of the number of students aged 14 enrolled in the old and new system
In the School Census we can obtain the number of students enrolled in the new
system per grade and year of birth. The same applies to those enrolled in the old system.
Therefore, we are able to separate those who have been treated from those who have not.
For example, we have information on the number of individuals who were 14 years old in
2004 (so they were born in 1990) enrolled in the new or old system for each grade. As
the expected age to complete elementary school is 14 years, we cannot use the proportion
of young people over this age, because we would be selecting individuals who for some
reason are not in the appropriate grade. In addition, it is not possible to identify whether
students who are in high school, therefore aged 15 or over, have been covered by the policy.
Due to the limitations of the database, we cannot follow the same students over
time, we assume that a large proportion of them continue to live in the same locality as
six years ago. This is not a huge problem, as we can separate those who have been covered
by the program from those who have not been regardless of their region of residence.
Table 1 shows the proportion of students covered by the reform over the years. In
the first year of analysis, approximately 7% of them were in the new system at 14 years of
age. When the law was enacted, the proportion changed to 10%. It is to be expected that
a small proportion of individuals were treated in the first few years after the enactment of
the law, as it takes at least eight years for them to reach at least 14 years of age. This is
visible in 2014, when the proportion of 14-year-olds reaches 76%.
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for educational database.
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2004 496 0.07 0.13 0 0.89
2005 496 0.07 0.14 0 0.90
2006 496 0.10 0.17 0 0.92
2007 496 0.10 0.17 0 0.93
2008 496 0.10 0.18 0 0.95
2009 496 0.10 0.17 0 0.90
2010 496 0.12 0.17 0 0.87
2011 496 0.17 0.17 0 0.96
2012 496 0.29 0.17 0 1
2013 496 0.47 0.17 0 0.92
2014 496 0.76 0.15 0 1
2015 496 0.98 0.06 0.15 1
2016 496 0.99 0.03 0.25 1
2017 496 0.99 0.01 0.29 1
Source: School Census, (INEP, 2019). Weighted means for municipal population aged 14 years old.
Figure 3 – Early entrance program expansion in the state of Rio Grande do Sul: 14 years old.
Note: This figure shows the proportion of public school students aged 14 years old
covered by the reform in the municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul.
Source: School Census, (INEP, 2019). Elaborated by the authors.
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Figures 3 shows the proportion of students aged 14 years old covered by the policy
in each municipality of Rio Grande do Sul. We can notice that the variable increases
mainly after 2010. This is expected, as individuals affected by the policy at the age of six
take a few years to turn 14.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the treatment intensity variable over time.
The proportion of students covered by the policy increases over the years, with some
discontinuities in the trend. We expected this pattern because of the age we were using to
create our variable.
Figure 4 – Lowess smoothing analysis: 14 years old.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Figure 5 – Histogram analysis: Treatment intensity over the years.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Figure 5 represents the histogram analysis of our variable of interest. The density
of 14-year-old students begins to shift more visibly in 2010. The complete displacement
occurs in 2015.
4.1.2 Crime database
We formulate our crime database using data provided by Department of Public
Security of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. Crimes are reported for violent crimes (car
theft and murder), auto theft, and drug dealing. Total crime represents the sum of all
these crimes.
Crime data are aggregated by the age of the offender at the municipally level. We
make an adjustment to this age on the database. Since we have the information on the
date of birth of offenders, we use it to calculate their age on the last day of the year in
which the report was made. For example, if the crime was committed in April and the
offender was born in September, the age used will be that on December 31st. We make
this adjustment because on the basis of the School Census, which we use to calculate the
proportion of students covered by the reform, the age of the students refers to the last
day of the year. We use the log of number of reported crimes committed by 14 year-olds.
Equation 2 shows how this variable was created for the municipality m at in period t. We
add one unit before the logs are taken.
Equation (2):
Crime = Log[(Number of crimes committed by individuals aged 14) + 1]
Table 2 shows the gender, ethnicity and crimes committed for this age. Most of
the crimes were committed by men, representing about 84% of the sample. The white
population represents the majority of offenders, with 62% aged 14. In relation to these
percentage, it should be noted that the population living in the Southern region of Brazil
is characterized by a high proportion of white individuals. According to IBGE (2019)
data, the white population in Rio Grande do Sul corresponds to 83.22% of total, followed
by the brown population with 10.57%. The rest of the sample is composed of non-white
people, corresponding to blacks and browns.
On average, the majority of reported crimes are related to drug dealing. This
represents an average of 4.07 incidences in the period. Auto theft has the lowest average,
at approximately 0.11 incidents for 14-year-olds. When we analyze the average of the sum
of the crimes, the incidence corresponds to 4.76.
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for crime database and controls, 2004-2017.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
General Characteristics
Female 6,944 0.16 0.27 0 1
Male 6,944 0.84 0.27 0 1
White 6,944 0.62 0.38 0 1
No white 6,944 0.38 0.38 0 1
Crime
Total crime 6,944 4.76 13.56 0 90
Auto theft 6,944 0.11 0.40 0 6
Drug dealing 6,944 4.07 12.35 0 82
Car theft 6,944 0.30 0.86 0 6
Murder 6,944 0.26 1.09 0 8
Violent Crime 6,944 0.57 1.73 0 14
Control variables
Log of GDP per capita 6,944 9.82 0.60 8.15 12.61
Population density 6,944 89.07 325.59 1.57 3146.04
Proportion aged 14 6,944 0.01 0.002 0.00 0.03
Source: Department of Public Security of the State of Rio Grande do Sul; IBGE (2019). Crime variables
represent the number of reported crimes. Weighted means are presented.
Since we are using a specific age, many municipalities have zero crime values over
the years. We consulted official data from the Department of Public Security of the State
of Rio Grande do Sul. These data show the total number of crimes per municipality
without considering a specific age. Our database values are very close when we aggregate
without considering our specific sample. Although our data include untried crimes, our
base may be underestimated. Considering that not all crimes are reported, it is possible
that a greater number of crimes occurred compared to those that were recorded. Our
number of observations is also limited because we excluded the reports as victims, which
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represents the vast majority of observations (80%). Although there are these restrictions,
we consider that the observations reflect the criminal behavior of these youths, because it
includes all available reported crimes. We understand that a high number of information
equal to zero may influence the results, but since the number of crimes in our base is very
close to that observed in official reports and that we have a low amount of incomplete
data, we believe that the values actually reflect the behavior of this age in the state.
4.1.3 Methodology
This study aims to analyze the relation of early entrance reform on reported crimes
committed by 14 year olds. We investigate whether individuals exposed to treatment in
the first grade of elementary school are less likely to commit crimes in adolescence. We
calculated for each year of analysis the proportion of individuals in each municipality aged
14 who were covered by the program. We argue that these individuals were exposed to the
new system when they were 6 years old. As stated earlier, we can separate treated and
untreated individuals. When the school adopts the policy, the enrollment of new students
is computed in a School Census variable that differs from the old system. Therefore,
if students were treated at age 6, their enrollment at age 14 is in this variable, which
indicates that they are in the new system. The enrollment of students not exposed to the
policy remains in the variable of the old system.
The starting point of our analysis is that the effect of the reform results from a
change in the curriculum and not from an additional year of schooling. As stated, the
policy has made new students increase their academic skills instead of just focusing on
socialization and playing. Individuals exposed to this reform have more time to learn
literacy and numeracy, which can help them to understand the content taught more easily.
These learning gains are reflected throughout basic education, reducing the chances of
failing or dropping out of school. It can discourage them from committing crimes during
adolescence due to the opportunities in the labor market may be greater than those of
crime. Rosa et al. (2019) also use the same argument to estimate the effect of this policy on
student’s performance. They find that students exposed to this change in the curriculum
improve their Mathematics and Portuguese scores. Qualitative studies support this change
in curriculum through interviews with teachers and document analysis, such as Jacomini
et al. (2012) and Pansini and Marin (2011).
Our empirical strategy to estimate the relation of early entrance reform on juvenile
crime is based on the construction of a treatment intensity variable. This variable represents
the proportion of students covered by the policy in relation to the total number of students
in each municipality. We can use this approach because our variable is continuous and
varies across municipalities.
Our crime variables are the log of number of reported crimes committed by 14
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years old youths for each municipality. Our main assumption is that the variation in the
proportion of students covered by the program is unlikely to be correlated with reported
crimes. There is no evidence that the reform was implemented to reduce crime in any
region, especially in the peripheries. If a municipality underreports crimes, either as a
whole or for a specific age group, such as the group we are using, to justify the benefits of
this reform, this would be a problem.
We estimate the following regression:
Equation (3):
Crimeamt = α + β1Propamt + β2Mm + β3Tt + β4Xmt + εmt
where a represents individuals aged 14, m municipality, and t represents the time.
In equation (3), the dependent variable Crime denotes the log of number of reported
crimes committed in municipality m at time t. Prop is the treatment intensity variable in
the municipality m at time t. The variable M represents municipality fixed effects and
control for differences in municipalities that are common across years. The variable T
indicates year fixed effects and control for differences across time that are common to all
municipalities. We also include control variables represented by vector X. We control for
population density, proportion of youths aged 14 years old, and the log of GDP per capita.
We deflated it by the implicit deflator of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the base
year 2010. The population density variable corresponds to the total number of inhabitants
in the municipality divided by its total area.
Our coefficient of interest is β1 and it corresponds to the estimative of the relation
between the proportion of students covered by the policy and the crime variable. This
estimate measures whether municipalities with higher proportion of students treated
experienced a greater decrease in reported crime rate.
We estimate our model using weighted least squares. The weight used is the
municipal population aged 14 years old. The standard errors estimated are clustered at
the municipal level. This procedure accounts for the potential serial correlation of error
terms over time within a municipality (Bertrand et al., 2004).
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5 RESULTS
5.1 Juvenile crime and the early entrance reform
Table 3 shows the main results of our coefficient β1 of equation (3) for each type of
crime. Each column represents a separate regression. Columns 1-6 represent the estimates
using weighted least squares. Appendices 14-19 contain the most detailed estimates for
each type of crime.
The Prop variable measures how the increase of one percentage point in the
proportion of enrollments in the new system affects the number of crimes. The findings
indicate that the exposure to reform increases auto thefts committed by 14-year-olds. An
one percentage point increase in the proportion of treated students affects by 0.21% the
number of auto thefts. Total crime, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime
were not significant. This indicates that a one percentage point increase in the treatment
intensity variable does not significantly affect these crimes.
Table 3 – Juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2004-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.10 0.21** 0.08 -0.31 -0.10 -0.23
(0.20) (0.09) (0.21) (0.24) (0.10) (0.20)
Population density 0.00* -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.15 0.07 -0.21 -0.05 0.03 -0.01
(0.20) (0.05) (0.18) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
Proportion aged 14 11.34 0.43 14.18 3.41 -1.65 0.30
(9.39) (2.03) (9.07) (4.80) (2.74) (3.87)
Constant 0.23 -0.21 0.82 -1.91 -1.05 -1.84
(1.89) (0.44) (1.87) (1.67) (0.93) (1.65)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.26 0.08 0.29 0.29 0.11 0.21
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime. We control for population density,
log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Our estimates remain significant and positive even with the addition of control
variables. The magnitude is also very close as we use them. The same is true for those
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crimes that were not significant. They remain without significance even after the use of
controls (see Appendices 14-19 for more details).
Although we expect a negative correlation on crime, this policy can also have a
positive correlation on that. Individuals more likely to commit crimes are also affected
by it. They can commit delinquencies within school or encourage other peers to commit
crimes. The effects may include the increase in cases of gang activity or decrease in
the perception of school safety. This delinquent behavior can also happen outside of
school, increasing the number of crimes committed around it. Some studies support this
argument. Billings and Phillips (2017) showed that schools with many high risk students
may have more negative social interactions, making the school a place that intensifies
criminal outcomes. Bayer et al. (2009), Damm and Dustmann (2014), and Corno (2017)
show the peer effects of crime. Students who are more crime-prone may engage in criminal
activities during school as well as encourage other students. Although we cannot identify
which students are more likely to commit crimes and whether they may be interfering
with the positive outcomes we find, the above evidence indicates a likely mechanism in
which the policy correlates with crime.
We also estimate the relation of reform by gender. However, we could not calculate
the proportion of individuals treated by it before 2007 due to the School Census which
does not allow us to separate the number of enrollments per year of birth between these
groups. Although our estimates begin in 2007, we do not believe that this is a problem,
since the higher proportion of enrollments increases after 2010.
Table 4 shows the results for males. Tables 20-25 contain the most detailed results.
We also found an increase in the crime for them. A one percentage point increase in
the proportion of men covered by the reform affects by 0.20% the number auto thefts.
The magnitude is very close when we do not estimate for males and females separately.
Moreover, even with the use of a panel containing a shorter period of time, the estimate
remains significant and positive for auto theft. The other types of crime are still not
significant, suggesting that the reform for males has no relation on these categories.
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Table 4 – Males: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2007-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.23 0.20** 0.19 -0.33 -0.09 -0.21
(0.27) (0.08) (0.29) (0.23) (0.11) (0.18)
Population density 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.32 0.01 -0.29 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15
(0.22) (0.05) (0.19) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14)
Proportion aged 14 21.99 -3.90 22.67 6.97 -0.33 5.82
(16.87) (4.43) (15.17) (8.43) (5.23) (7.89)
Constant 3.07 0.35 2.90 -1.65 0.42 -0.09
(2.32) (0.53) (2.00) (1.98) (0.84) (1.58)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.29 0.10 0.21
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime committed by males. We control
for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of males aged 14 years old. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by
municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For females, the results in Table 5 also show an increase in the incidence of auto
theft. The correlation is estimated to be a 0.06% increase in the number of this crime
committed by them. The results remain similar even with the addition of the control
variables. See Appendices 26-31 for more details.
Although our sample is composed mostly of males, our results are a good suggestion
for the delinquent behavior of females in this policy. Cano-Urbina and Lochner (2017)
found out that increases in average state schooling levels reduce female arrest rates for
violent and property crime but has less effect on white-collar crimes. Our estimates show
a positive result among one type of property crime - auto theft. However, we are not
evaluating the additional year of schooling as Cano-Urbina and Lochner (2017), but rather
a change in the student’s curriculum. This may be an indication that our policy is not
sufficient to discourage delinquent behavior among females. We have no information on
white-collar crimes to estimate whether the change in the curriculum also affects this type
of crime.
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Table 5 – Females: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2007-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.01 0.06** 0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.16
(0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10)
Population density 0.00*** -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(0.15) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Proportion aged 14 6.45 3.47 5.72 -0.47 -0.68 -1.15
(8.19) (2.17) (7.56) (1.36) (1.76) (2.34)
Constant -0.54 -0.07 -0.62 -0.62 0.43 -0.19
(1.66) (0.12) (1.20) (0.50) (0.61) (0.68)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.13
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime committed by females. We control
for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by
municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To check whether the estimates are persistent at other ages, we calculate the
correlation of the policy for young people aged 13-17, separately. To calculate the
proportion of 13-year-olds covered by the reform, we use the same approach as for 14-year-
olds. In the case of other ages, we use the values with lag. For example, to calculate the
proportion of 15-year-olds in 2006, we used the proportion of 14-year-olds in 2005. As we
mentioned, we could not separate which students were covered by the policy after that
age. Even with this limitation, the variables are able to capture the proportion of students
covered at 15, 16, and 17 years of age. We did not use 18-year-olds because the expected
age for completion of high school is 17 and other factors can interfere with delinquent
behavior.
As expected, the relation at these ages is also positive on crime. Crimes committed
by 13-year-olds (see Table 6) include auto thefts and car thefts. In the case of the former,
the relation persists at other ages and its magnitude also increases. It changes from 0.05%
at age 13 to 0.21% at age 14. For 15-year-olds, the relation is even greater, estimated at
0.27%. At subsequent ages it is not significant.
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Table 6 – 13 years old: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2004-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.04 0.05** -0.04 -0.12 0.11** -0.01
(0.15) (0.02) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Proportion aged 13 9.32* 0.24 8.63 4.30** -0.77 3.53**
(5.63) (1.22) (5.28) (2.00) (0.84) (1.63)
Constant -1.44* -0.64 -0.93 -0.70 0.25 -0.45
(0.86) (0.44) (0.88) (0.63) (0.21) (0.52)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.11
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime. We control for population density,
log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 13 years old. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 13 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7 – 15 years old: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2005-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.14 0.27*** -0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.01
(0.19) (0.10) (0.21) (0.28) (0.18) (0.22)
Population density 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.38** 0.02 -0.34** -0.40*** -0.25 -0.48**
(0.16) (0.05) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21)
Proportion aged 15 85.16** -35.63** 77.72** 121.43** 77.46*** 115.13***
(37.23) (16.42) (36.52) (56.43) (29.34) (34.78)
Constant 1.57 1.06 1.60 -1.90 -0.88 -0.05
(1.86) (1.12) (1.80) (2.81) (1.55) (2.06)
Observations 6,448 6,448 6,448 6,448 6,448 6,448
R-squared 0.35 0.06 0.34 0.39 0.22 0.34
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime. We control for population density,
log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 15 years old. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 15 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Another important aspect is that the type of crime changes for 16-17 year olds.
Drug dealing and total crime represent an increase at these ages. Estimates in Table
8 shows that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of 16 year olds treated
represents an increase of 0.31% and 0.38% in the number of drug dealing and total crime,
respectively. The relation is even greater for 17-year-olds. Estimates in Table 9 show that
there is an increase of 0.47% in the case of drug dealing and 0.42% in total crime. The
relation between the other crimes and the policy remain not significant for these ages even
using control variables.
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Table 8 – 16 years old: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2006-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.38** 0.08 0.31* -0.25 0.27 0.21
(0.17) (0.10) (0.19) (0.35) (0.16) (0.24)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00*** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.05 0.04 -0.12 -0.33* 0.06 -0.16
(0.15) (0.07) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)
Proportion aged 16 54.74 7.18 59.90 206.95* 70.86** 120.48**
(37.92) (17.84) (47.17) (108.83) (34.09) (57.62)
Constant -0.52 -0.61 0.11 -5.52 -3.67** -3.38
(2.05) (0.82) (2.24) (4.35) (1.77) (2.68)
Observations 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
R-squared 0.38 0.06 0.35 0.43 0.20 0.37
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime. We control for population density,
log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 16 years old. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 16 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9 – 17 years old: juvenile crime and the early entrance reform, 2007-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.42** -0.16 0.47*** 0.06 0.25 0.35
(0.17) (0.11) (0.18) (0.28) (0.21) (0.25)
Population density 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 0.01* 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.30** -0.06 -0.27* -0.42** -0.36** -0.55***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Proportion aged 17 -5.69 -91.40** -44.12 275.19* 210.28*** 236.14***
(56.28) (40.81) (84.15) (141.60) (74.85) (79.48)
Constant 4.04** 3.42*** 4.22 -6.24 -2.00 -1.14
(1.75) (1.23) (2.64) (5.49) (2.51) (3.07)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.39 0.04 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.41
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of the number of total
crime, auto theft, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime. We control for population density,
log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 17 years old. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 17 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The above estimates provide some indications of the criminal behavior of youths.
First, we notice that the magnitude of the results increases with age, especially auto thefts.
Other crimes remain insignificant among 13-15 year olds, excluding car theft for 13 years
old. For young people aged 16-17, involvement in delinquent behaviour is related to drug
dealing. The magnitude is even greater for those who are 17 years old. In both ages total
crime is also significant. Therefore, we observe a change in delinquent behavior as age
increases.
Our estimates converge to the statements of Farrington (1986); Piquero et al.
(2007) and Bosick (2009). They argue that criminal behavior among young people grows
between 15 and 19 years old. Among those ages, youths are more likely to commit
delinquent behavior. Our estimates may be capturing this relation due to the increase in
the magnitude of the estimates as the age increases.
It is important to highlight some caveats on our empirical strategy. First, our
analysis has high internal validity, but low external validity. Brazil is a country that
presents great cultural and population diversity, restricting our ability to generalize our
estimates to other regions, especially when our results refer mainly to reports of crimes
committed by white people, which in other regions, such as the North and Northeast, do
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not represent the majority of the population.
Another limitation is the restriction of the database. Our analysis is based on a
specific age group and for offenders. This greatly limits the number of observations with
values other than zero. However, as we argued, we have strong evidence that our base
reflects the criminal behavior of them.
Finally, we understand that estimates for total crime and drug dealing may be
more robust due to the higher number of cases. Since we have less information for auto
thefts and car thefts, the estimates may be more sensitive to some variations that occur in
the number of such crimes in municipalities.
5.2 Robustness check
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, we estimate the correlation of
the policy using other specifications. We created the log of crime reports per 100,000 of
the 14 years old population. We calculate the number of inhabitants of this age using the
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística data (IBGE, 2019; Sidra, 2019).
The equation 4 shows how the variable is created.
Equation (4)
Crime = Log[(Number of crimes committed by individuals aged 14Number of inhabitants of age 14 in the municipality )x100, 000]
Table 10 shows that results for 14-year-olds remain significant and positive. Es-
timates indicate that an one-percentage point increase in program coverage affects the
incidences by 2.94% of auto theft rate. The other crimes are still not significant, even
when we use this new variable. Tables 32-37 show that the magnitude of the relation
remains consistent even with the addition of control variables.
The same pattern is found when we estimate by gender. For females, an one-
percentage point increase in program coverage affects the incidences by 1.01% of auto
theft rate. For males it is even greater, with an increase by 2.96%. See Table 11 and 12
for more details.
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Table 10 – Estimates for the log of crime rate, 2004-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.75 2.94** 1.19 -1.70 -0.19 0.56
(1.32) (1.19) (1.37) (1.58) (1.11) (1.04)
Populational density 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.58 1.02 -0.70 -0.74 0.55 0.27
(1.13) (0.66) (1.51) (1.00) (0.87) (1.23)
Proportion aged 14 -23.12 -70.08** 24.99 -23.75 -83.73** -59.09
(66.07) (30.38) (66.70) (54.43) (36.06) (42.28)
Constant -9.08 -7.05 0.94 -14.37 -18.38 -13.03
(11.09) (5.40) (15.96) (12.16) (11.93) (13.37)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.11
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of total crime rate, auto
theft rate, drug dealing rate, murder rate, car theft rate and violent crime rate. We control for population
density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at
the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11 – Females: estimates for the log of crime rate, 2007-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 0.80 1.01** 0.64 -2.21 -0.33 -2.58
(1.04) (0.46) (1.21) (1.69) (0.26) (1.67)
Populational density 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.17 0.38* 0.72 0.30 -0.58 -0.40
(2.38) (0.19) (1.55) (0.34) (0.95) (0.82)
Proportion aged 14 -83.72 -111.45*** -99.27 -177.00*** -172.42*** -180.28***
(138.32) (37.64) (128.76) (25.50) (25.15) (36.41)
Constant -11.19 -7.04*** -16.94 -16.22* 1.73 -8.60
(25.91) (1.89) (17.57) (8.36) (9.79) (11.10)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.14
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of total crime rate,
auto theft rate, drug dealing rate, murder rate, car theft rate and violent crime rate committed by females.
We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of females aged 14 years old.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
weighted by municipal population of 14 year old females. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
35
Table 12 – Males: estimates for the log of crime rate, 2007-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop 1.54 2.96*** 1.59 -1.87 0.00 0.83
(1.44) (1.08) (1.45) (1.57) (1.24) (0.91)
Populational density -0.01 -0.01** -0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -0.01 0.22 -0.56 -1.26 -1.20 -1.76
(1.00) (0.73) (1.03) (1.55) (1.10) (1.59)
Proportion aged 14 -87.40 -244.89*** -31.32 -87.96 -190.63*** -108.77
(118.56) (62.33) (114.33) (91.61) (64.64) (86.20)
Constant 3.09 0.99 7.20 -7.90 2.84 11.48
(12.97) (8.42) (13.84) (18.07) (11.54) (17.81)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of total crime rate,
auto theft rate, drug dealing rate, murder rate, car theft rate and violent crime rate committed by males.
We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of males aged 14 years old.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
weighted by municipal population of 14 year old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We also check if our results remain consistent when the estimates contain private
schools. We calculate our treatment intensity variable with the sum of public and private
school enrollments in each municipality. Therefore, this proportion refers to the sum of
these two models of education, which is different from our variable used in the preferred
model that takes only public schools into account. Table 13 indicates that the magnitude is
positive and similar in this case. The other crimes are still not significant in this estimation.
We have not analyzed the relation of the policy with private schools because unobserved
characteristics can interfere with a child’s enrolment in a private school. Perception of
better quality education, more learning and opportunities in the labor market may be
affecting this choice.
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Table 13 – Estimates for students in public and private schools, 2004-2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total crime Auto theft Drug dealing Murder Car theft Violent crime
Prop -0.03 0.22** -0.08 -0.33 -0.07 -0.22
(0.23) (0.10) (0.24) (0.26) (0.09) (0.20)
Populational density 0.00* -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.16 0.07 -0.22 -0.05 0.03 -0.00
(0.20) (0.05) (0.19) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
Proportion aged 14 11.32 0.42 14.16 3.43 -1.64 0.31
(9.32) (2.04) (9.03) (4.82) (2.75) (3.86)
Constant 0.31 -0.19 0.91 -1.93 -1.07 -1.86
(1.90) (0.45) (1.89) (1.68) (0.95) (1.67)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.26 0.08 0.29 0.29 0.11 0.21
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variables are the log of total crime rate, auto
theft rate, drug dealing rate, murder rate, car theft rate and violent crime rate. We control for population
density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at
the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population
aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Our robustness tests indicate that our results remain significant and positive in
magnitude. Even when we use a crime rate, our estimates remain with the same sign.
The same is true for the results by gender. In this case, a shorter period of our panel also
maintained the positive results. The use of control variables did not affect our estimates
in both cases either. Finally, we added private school enrollments to our variable. The
estimates, once again, remained with positive magnitude. Therefore, we provide even




This thesis aimed to analyze the correlation of education on juvenile crime by
exploring a change in compulsory schooling law passed in Brazil in 2006. The law
transformed the last year of preschool into the first year of elementary school. As a result,
new students enter school at age six instead of seven. We argue that the change in the
curriculum, which altered the content taught in this grade, allowed students to learn
academic skills earlier instead of just focusing on socialization and playing. This gave
all students more time to learn the content, making it more understandable to everyone.
This reflects throughout the student’s elementary education and it decreases the chances
of failing and dropping out of school. Students more engaged in school increase their
opportunity costs in committing delinquent behavior because the benefits that education
provides are more valued.
We analyze the relation of this policy in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This state
presents the best conditions for the estimates, both in relation to the criminal database
and the aspect of the program coverage in the municipalities. We estimate a panel between
2004 and 2017 using a treatment intensity variable that measures the proportion of 14 years
old students covered by the reform in each municipality. We argue that these students
were exposed to the new academic curriculum in the first grade of elementary school.
Our estimates point to an increase in the reported crime for this age. The findings
indicate that the exposure to reform increases auto thefts committed by 14-year-olds. An
increase on one percentage point in the proportion of treated students is related to an
increase of 0.21% on the number of auto thefts. The relation between the policy and total
crime, drug dealing, murder, car theft and violent crime is not significant. The addition of
control variables seem to not change our main results. We also estimate the correlation
for other ages to check if it persists. In all cases the magnitude was significant and
with positive sign. An interesting aspect was that the magnitude and type of delinquent
behavior varies with age. Older youths tend to become more involved in drug dealing.
The robustness tests showed that the relation of the policy remained significant and with
a positive signal across all specifications. This provides strong evidence that the relation
of the policy on juvenile crime is indeed positive.
The effects of educational policies can be positive on criminal outcomes and that
depends on incentives related to opportunity costs. Individuals with lower opportunity
costs in crime may have higher incentives to commit them because they understand that
returns in the formal market may have little advantage. Education can also encourage crime.
This can happen through interaction between crime-prone youths in the same environment,
such as in school, for example. This interaction can form delinquent groups that act within
the school, around it or elsewhere. They can also encourage other individuals to commit
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crime, both by forcing them and by influencing them. Our estimates may be capturing
that.
We consider that our results are still preliminary and capture a correlation between
the new policy and juvenile crime. Further estimates that identify causality in the
relationship between these variables and the use of zero inflated models constitute the
next steps in this thesis.
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APPENDICES
Table 14 – Estimates for the log of number of total crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Population density 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.16 -0.15
(0.20) (0.20)
Proportion aged 14 11.34
(9.39)
Constant 0.31** -1.08 0.51 0.23
(0.15) (0.85) (1.91) (1.89)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of total crime
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 15 – Estimates for the log of number of auto thefts.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.22** 0.21** 0.21** 0.21**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Population density -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Proportion aged 14 0.43
(2.03)
Constant 0.05 0.53** -0.20 -0.21
(0.03) (0.24) (0.45) (0.44)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of auto thefts
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 16 – Estimates for the log of number of drug dealing.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.22 -0.21
(0.18) (0.18)
Proportion aged 14 14.18
(9.07)
Constant 0.22* -1.05 1.18 0.82
(0.13) (0.91) (1.91) (1.87)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of drug
deealing committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 17 – Estimates for the log of number of robbery.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
(0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Population density 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Proportion aged 14 -1.65
(2.74)
Constant 0.04 -0.83* -1.09 -1.05
(0.09) (0.49) (0.94) (0.93)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of robbery
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 18 – Estimates for the log of number of murder.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.37 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
(0.35) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.05 -0.05
(0.09) (0.09)
Proportion aged 14 3.41
(4.80)
Constant 0.03 -2.35 -1.83 -1.91
(0.04) (1.58) (1.68) (1.67)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.29
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of murder
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 19 – Estimates for the log of number of violent crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.28 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
(0.29) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Population density 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.01 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
Proportion aged 14 0.30
(3.87)
Constant 0.05 -1.89 -1.83 -1.84
(0.11) (1.22) (1.66) (1.65)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.21
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of violent crime
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 20 – Males: estimates for the log of number of total crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
prop 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)






Constant 0.44*** -0.04 3.37 3.07
(0.10) (0.89) (2.33) (2.32)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of total crime
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 21 – Males: estimates for the log of number of auto thefts.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.21** 0.20** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Population density -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Proportion aged 14 -3.90
(4.43)
Constant 0.02 0.42** 0.30 0.35
(0.03) (0.19) (0.54) (0.53)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of auto thefts
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 22 – Males: estimates for the log of number of drug dealing.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19
(0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.30 -0.29
(0.19) (0.19)
Proportion aged 14 22.67
(15.17)
Constant 0.32*** 0.02 3.20 2.90
(0.11) (0.79) (2.02) (2.00)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of drug dealing
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 23 – Males: estimates for the log of number of robbery.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Population density 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.09 -0.09
(0.08) (0.08)
Proportion aged 14 -0.33
(5.23)
Constant 0.23*** -0.51* 0.42 0.42
(0.07) (0.30) (0.85) (0.84)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of robbery
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 24 – Males: estimates for the log of number of murder.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.38 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33
(0.35) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Population density 0.00* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.09 -0.08
(0.13) (0.12)
Proportion aged 14 6.97
(8.43)
Constant 0.04 -2.46 -1.56 -1.65
(0.05) (1.55) (2.00) (1.98)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.29
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of murders
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 25 – Males: estimates for the log of number of violent crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.24 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21
(0.27) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Population density 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.15 -0.15
(0.14) (0.14)
Proportion aged 14 5.82
(7.89)
Constant 0.25*** -1.59* -0.01 -0.09
(0.05) (0.96) (1.62) (1.58)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.21
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of violent
crime committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 26 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of total crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Population density 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00
(0.16) (0.15)
Proportion aged 14 6.45
(8.19)
Constant 0.19*** -0.45** -0.47 -0.54
(0.05) (0.20) (1.70) (1.66)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of total
crime committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 27 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of auto theft.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.06* 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population density -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Proportion aged 14 3.47
(2.17)
Constant -0.00 0.13 -0.03 -0.07
(0.01) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of auto
thefts committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 28 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of drug dealing.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Population density 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.02 0.03
(0.11) (0.11)
Proportion aged 14 5.72
(7.56)
Constant 0.15*** -0.30 -0.56 -0.62
(0.04) (0.24) (1.24) (1.20)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of drug
dealing committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita,
and proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 29 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of robbery.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
prop -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)






Constant 0.03 0.02 0.43 0.43
(0.03) (0.02) (0.62) (0.61)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of robbery
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 30 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of murder.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Proportion aged 14 -0.47
(1.36)
Constant 0.01*** -0.51 -0.63 -0.62
(0.00) (0.36) (0.50) (0.50)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.19
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of murders
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 31 – Females: Estimates for the log of number of violent crime.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.03 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Proportion aged 14 -1.15
(2.34)
Constant 0.04* -0.49 -0.20 -0.19
(0.03) (0.35) (0.70) (0.68)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of number of violent
crime committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 32 – Estimates for the log of total crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.75
(1.31) (1.33) (1.31) (1.32)
Population density -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.59 0.58
(1.14) (1.13)
Proportion aged 14 -23.12
(66.07)
Constant -4.00*** -3.76 -9.67 -9.08
(0.49) (4.97) (11.42) (11.09)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of total crime rate
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 33 – Estimates for the log of auto theft rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 3.11** 2.89** 2.94** 2.94**
(1.38) (1.20) (1.20) (1.19)
Population density -0.01* -0.01* -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 1.06 1.02
(0.66) (0.66)
Proportion aged 14 -70.08**
(30.38)
Constant -6.42*** 1.86 -8.82 -7.05
(0.53) (3.96) (5.47) (5.40)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of auto theft rate
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 34 – Estimates for the log of drug dealing rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 1.21 1.23 1.19 1.19
(1.36) (1.39) (1.37) (1.37)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -0.72 -0.70
(1.52) (1.51)
Proportion aged 14 24.99
(66.70)
Constant -5.12*** -5.65 1.57 0.94
(0.48) (7.12) (16.50) (15.96)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of drug dealing rate
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 35 – Estimates for the log of robbery rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.43 -0.22 -0.19 -0.19
(1.48) (1.13) (1.11) (1.11)
Population density 0.01* 0.01* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.60 0.55
(0.88) (0.87)
Proportion aged 14 -83.73**
(36.06)
Constant -6.70*** -14.50*** -20.50* -18.38
(0.95) (5.52) (11.96) (11.93)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of robbery rate committed
by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged
14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 36 – Estimates for the log of murder rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -2.06 -1.66 -1.70 -1.70
(2.21) (1.58) (1.58) (1.58)
Population density 0.02* 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -0.73 -0.74
(1.00) (1.00)
Proportion aged 14 -23.75
(54.43)
Constant -7.07*** -22.29** -14.97 -14.37
(0.44) (9.37) (12.45) (12.16)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.23
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of murder rate committed
by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of youths aged
14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 37 – Estimates for the log of violent crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.56
(1.20) (1.07) (1.04) (1.04)
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.30 0.27
(1.24) (1.23)
Proportion aged 14 -59.09
(42.28)
Constant -6.76*** -11.53*** -14.53 -13.03
(1.06) (3.95) (13.55) (13.37)
Observations 6,944 6,944 6,944 6,944
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of violent crime rate
committed by 14-year-olds. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
youths aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population aged 14 years old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 38 – Females: estimates for the log of total crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.70 0.79 0.80 0.80
(0.96) (1.03) (1.03) (1.04)
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.18 0.17
(2.38) (2.38)
Proportion aged 14 -83.72
(138.32)
Constant -4.23*** -10.20** -12.10 -11.19
(0.43) (4.38) (26.53) (25.91)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of total crime rate
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 39 – Females: estimates for the log of auto theft rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 1.02** 0.98** 1.01** 1.01**
(0.51) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Population density -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.39** 0.38*
(0.19) (0.19)
Proportion aged 14 -111.45***
(37.64)
Constant -6.48*** -4.17*** -8.24*** -7.04***
(0.17) (1.30) (1.93) (1.89)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of auto theft rate
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 40 – Females: estimates for the log of drug dealing rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.64
(1.11) (1.20) (1.20) (1.21)
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.73 0.72
(1.55) (1.55)
Proportion aged 14 -99.27
(128.76)
Constant -4.60*** -10.36** -18.02 -16.94
(0.37) (4.51) (17.99) (17.57)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of drug dealing rate
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
71
Table 41 – Females: estimates for the log of robbery rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -0.29 -0.30 -0.33 -0.33
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26)
Population density -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita -0.56 -0.58
(0.95) (0.95)
Proportion aged 14 -172.42***
(25.15)
Constant -6.14*** -5.97*** -0.13 1.73
(0.30) (0.24) (9.95) (9.79)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of robbery rate committed
by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 42 – Females: estimates for the log of murder rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -2.36 -2.23 -2.21 -2.21
(2.12) (1.70) (1.69) (1.69)
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.32 0.30
(0.36) (0.34)
Proportion aged 14 -177.00***
(25.50)
Constant -6.23*** -14.80** -18.13** -16.22*
(0.04) (6.11) (8.53) (8.36)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.19
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of murder rate committed
by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of
females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 43 – Females: estimates for the log of violent crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -2.69 -2.55 -2.58 -2.58
(2.09) (1.68) (1.68) (1.67)
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -0.38 -0.40
(0.83) (0.82)
Proportion aged 14 -180.28***
(36.41)
Constant -5.90*** -14.51** -10.55 -8.60
(0.30) (5.91) (11.35) (11.10)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of violent crime rate
committed by 14-year-old females. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and
proportion of females aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old females. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 44 – Males: estimates for the log of total crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 1.70 1.57 1.58 1.54
(1.51) (1.45) (1.44) (1.44)
Population density -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita 0.03 -0.01
(1.02) (1.00)
Proportion aged 14 -87.40
(118.56)
Constant -3.12*** 2.26 1.90 3.09
(0.56) (7.26) (13.50) (12.97)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of total crime rate
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 45 – Males: estimates for the log of auto theft rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 3.20*** 3.04*** 3.06*** 2.96***
(1.14) (1.13) (1.12) (1.08)
Population density -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.33 0.22
(0.74) (0.73)
Proportion aged 14 -244.89***
(62.33)
Constant -6.29*** 1.13 -2.33 0.99
(0.41) (3.12) (8.44) (8.42)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of auto theft rate
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 46 – Males: estimates for the log of drug dealing rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 1.76 1.64 1.61 1.59
(1.54) (1.48) (1.47) (1.45)
Population density -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -0.54 -0.56
(1.04) (1.03)
Proportion aged 14 -31.32
(114.33)
Constant -3.86*** 1.11 6.78 7.20
(0.59) (7.22) (14.41) (13.84)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of drug dealing rate
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 47 – Males: estimates for the log of robbery rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.00
(1.51) (1.21) (1.25) (1.24)
Population density 0.01* 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -1.11 -1.20
(1.11) (1.10)
Proportion aged 14 -190.63***
(64.64)
Constant -4.48*** -11.37*** 0.26 2.84
(0.56) (3.50) (11.70) (11.54)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of robbery rate committed
by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of males
aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
78
Table 48 – Males: estimates for the log of murder rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop -2.10 -1.74 -1.83 -1.87
(2.19) (1.58) (1.58) (1.57)
Population density 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -1.22 -1.26
(1.56) (1.55)
Proportion aged 14 -87.96
(91.61)
Constant -6.29*** -21.89** -9.09 -7.90
(0.57) (8.74) (18.32) (18.07)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.22
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of murder rate committed
by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion of males
aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 49 – Males: estimates for the log of violent crime rate.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop 0.92 0.99 0.87 0.83
(1.00) (0.94) (0.90) (0.91)
Population density 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita -1.71 -1.76
(1.60) (1.59)
Proportion aged 14 -108.77
(86.20)
Constant -4.58*** -7.92** 10.00 11.48
(0.47) (3.89) (17.78) (17.81)
Observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of municipalities 496 496 496 496
Each column represents a separate regression. Our dependent variable is the log of violent crime rate
committed by 14-year-old males. We control for population density, log of GDP per capita, and proportion
of males aged 14 years old. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions weighted by municipal population of 14 years old males. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
